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CO0VER v. JOHNSON.
Where a statute provides that no condition attached to a sale of personal property
shall be valid as against creditors of the vendee or subsequent purchasers from such
vendee in good faith, unless such condition is evidenced by writing acknowledged and
recorded, a condition that the title shall not pass until payment of the price, although
unwritten and unrecorded, is valid as against creditors of the vendee who at the
time of the sale, had notice of the condition.

APPEAL.from Greene Circuit Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion, which was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-Johnson bought a pair of scales of Fairbanks &
Co. The sale was a conditional one, the title being retained in the
vendors until the property should be fully paid for. Johnson, after
the scales were shipped to him at the town of Republic, paid the
freight, receipted for them and asked and received permission of the
station agent for them to remain in the freight house, at Johnson's
risk. This permission was, shortly thereafter, extended on the
same terms, the station agent agreeing to ship the scales to Johnson in the state of Kansas, to which state Johnson soon afterwards
went, not having paid any portion of the'purchase-money. Coover
is a creditor of Johnson's of some years standing, a portion of the
indebtedness having accrued as far back as 1878, and all of it prior
to the time Johnson bought the scales. The note in suit is dated
January 23d 1882, due one day after date, and matured the day
Johnson made his exit. Coover kept store in Republic; was well
acquainted with Johnson, who at one time had done business for
him; knew of his intended departure two or three days before. it
occurred and, prior to suit brought, was thoroughly conversant with
the terms of the contract of sale made between Fairbanks & Co. and
Johnson. Coover having brought suit against Johnson and attached
the scales referred to, Fairbanks & Co. interpleaded,-claiming them
as their property, and on trial had of their interplea, the foregoing
facts were elicited.
On those facts, the court, at the instance of the interpleaders,
declared the law as follows:
. That if you believe from the evidence that Johnson was indebted
to Coover for the debt sued on in this suit at the time he executed
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the contract of purchase with Fairbanks & Co. for the scales, and
-that Johnson left the country and failed to carry out his contract
with Fairbanks & Co., and you further believe that Coover knew
the terms and conditions upon which Johnson purchased said scales,
and, with that knowledge, attached the scales in controversy as the
property of Johnson on said debt due from Johnson to him, Coover,
then the judgment should be for the interpleaders, Fairbanks & Co.
But the court, though requested by plaintiff so to do, refused to
declare the law, that: the condition in the contract of sale in evidence, that Fairbanks & Co. do not relinquish their title to the scales
and its attachments in question, until said property in question is
paid for, is null and void as to creditors of defendant Johnson, said
contract not having been acknowledged and recorded, as in case of
mortgaged personal property; and if the evidence proves that
defendant, Johnson, owed the plaintiff, Coover, the note here sued
on, when this suit of Coover's was commenced, and that the scale
and its attachments were shipped by interpleaders from St. Louis
to Republic, Mo., on the railroad, to defendant, Johnson, and at
Republic delivered by the railroad company to Johnson, and plaintiff, Coover, afterward had said property attached in this suit, then
interpleaders cannof recover it in this proceeding.
Other declarations of law were given, and others refused, but those
just copied present and contain the kernel of this cause.
It has frequently been decided in this state that the seller of per-"
sonal property might by contract with the buyer reserve the title of
such property in himself, until payment was made, and that such
reservation would be valid, even as against a bona fide purchaser:
Wangler v. Tranklin, 70 Mo. 659; Bobbins v. Phillips, 68 Id.
100, and cases cited; Sumner v. Cottey, 71 Id. 121.
IBut those adjudications were made in cases which arose prior to
the statutory provisions to which plaintiff's counsel have called our
attention. Section 2505, R. S., 1879, contains an amendment of,
or clause additional to, § 10, Gen. Stat., ch. 107, enacted in 1877,
in these words: "And no sale of goods and chattels, where possession is delivered to the vendee, shall be subject to any condition
whatever, as against creditors of the vendee, or subsequent purchasers from such vendee in good faith, unless such condition shall
be evidenced by writing, 6xecuted and acknowledged by the vendee,
and recorded as now provided in cases of mortgages of personal property." Section 2507, R. S., 1879, is an original section, enacted
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for the first time in 1877, and contains similar prohibitory provisions, declaring that " Such condition, in regard to the title so
remaining, shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers in good faith
and creditors, unless," etc. It cannot be doubted that the legislature, by these sections, intended to make a radical change in
the law relating to conditional sales of personal property, and to
prevent secret and unrecorded transactions and contracts of sale from
being used to the detriment of unsuspecting creditors of, or purchasers from, the vendee of personal property apparently the owner
thereof. This I regard as the whole object, purpose and scope of
the law, as it now stands.
Here, so far as the attaching creditor was concerned, there was
in fact no secret lien, no hidden trust, no false appearance, no concealed ownership ; nothing, in short to induce him to alter his
condition, incur needless litigation or expense, or which could in
any manner operate to his prejudice.
There is a wide divergence in judicial opinions as to the legal
effect which should be given to conditional sales of chattels, when
by the terms of the contract of sale, there is a reservation of title in
the vendor; but, except where controlled by statutory regulation,
all the authorities concur in holding the condition binding as between
the parties. And even those authorities which uncontrolled by
statute, hold that title will pass to a bonafide purchaser, deny this
result, where the purchaser has notice : Stadtfteld v. Hluntsman, 24
Alb. L. J., 185 ; 1 Benj. Sales, § 425.
In Illinois, by statutory provision, all such agreements are treated
as chattel mortgages, and void as to third persons if not recorded in
like manner as such instruments. The statute of that state makes
no exception in favor of any person whatsoever. -Notwithstanding
this, in a somewhat recent case, in that state, special stress was laid
on the fact that the creditor was bona fide, having no reason but to
rely on the apparent ownership of the property by his debtor; and
it was there ruled, that in this regard, a purchaser without notice and a
bona fide creditor stand on the same footing of equal protection:
Van Duzar v. Allen, 90 Ill. 499. In respect to a similar statute
in-our own state: § 2503, R. S., 1879, in relation to mortgages of
personal property, and requiring them to be recorded in order to their
validity against third persons, no exception having been made in
favor of any one, it has been several times ruled that, even if a purchaser had actualknowledge of the mortgage, he would nevertheless
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obtain a good title: .Byrsonv. Penix, 18 Mo., 13; Bevans v. Bolton,
31 Id. 437. And, in regard to § 2500, R. S., 1879, touching loans
of personal property, and making their registry requisite, so as to
be valid against creditors and purchasers, but containing no exception, a like ruling has been made: Cook v. Clippard, 12 Mo. 379.
If it be presumed that the legislature was not ignorant of the rulings
in the cases just cited, and taking this for granted, it must be
apparent, that when they inserted the words "as against creditors
of the vendee or subsequent purchasers from such vendee in good
faith," in § 2505, and similar words in § 2507, their design was to
prevent actual knowledge in a purchaser or creditor from being held
in less esteem than constructive notice, as imparted by the record.
The sections in question are somewhat awkwardly worded, but I am
persuaded that the expression bonafide, applies as well to creditors
as to subsequent purchasers. Indeed, no reason can be discovered
why the one class should receive greater legislative favors than the
other. Such statutes as the sections under discussion have, of late
years, been enacted in many of the states, as for instance in Vermont, where the statute provides that "No lien reserved on property sold conditionally, and passing into the hands of the conditional purchaser, shall be valid against attaching creditors or
subsequent purchasers without notice, unless," etc. And upon this
statute it was ruled, that as the contract of sale was not placed on
record, the property sold "was open to attachment as the property
of the conditional vendee, unless the plaintiff could show that the
attaching creditor had notice of the conditional sale." WFitcomb
v. Woodworth, 54 Vt. 544. A decision of like effect on similar
statutory provisions has been made in Iowa: Singer S. ff. Co. v.
.Holcomb, 40 Iowa 33.
The language of the statutes just cited, "attaching creditors or
subsequent purchasers without notice," is not essentially different
in point of legal effect from the phraseology employed in our own
law. "Without notice," and "in good faith," are equivalent terms:
Lee v. Bowman, 55 Mo. 400.
Holding these views, the judgment should be affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has
often held, that in the absence of.controlling statutory regulations, personal
property may be sold on condition, and
while the condition remains unperformed
the right of property remains in the yenVOL.XXXIV.--40 "

dor: Sumner v. Cottey, 71 Mo. 121;
1?idgeway v. Kennedy, 52 Id 24; Little
v. Page, 44 Id. 412 ; Parmleev. COtherwood, 36 Id. 479 ; Griffin v. Pugh, 44
Id. 326 ; Diver v. Denney, 6 Mo. App.
578; Willard v. Sumner, 7 Id. 577.
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And the same court holds that the vendor may assert his right to the property,*
even against a bonafide purchaser, unless
he (tile vendor) has been guilty oflachea:
Robbins v. Phillips, 68 Mo. 100, 101
Wanglerv.-Franklin, 70 Id. 660.
Yet it is to be observed that the decisions were made prior to the enactment
of the statute, construed in the principal
case.
This same rule has also been adopted
in. many other states: see I Benj. on
Sales (4th Am. ed.)
437, et seq.,
where the cases are collected.
But that the vendor may have control
over the property, in such cases, it is
necessary before he parts with possession
to expressly stipulate that the title shall
remain in him, until all the conditions
shall have been complied with by the
vendee; as in a contract of sale of
goods, which is to be complete after
examination and approval'by the purchaser; Blood v. Palmer, 11 Me. 420;
Crocker v. Gullfer, 44 Mo. 493;
Morse v. Stone, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 516.
Where the manifest intention of the
parties is, that the vendor retain the
title, no property passes until all conditiois are performed. Thus in Keeler v.
Field, 1 Paige Ch. 312, a merchant contracted for goods, the price to be secured
by his notes, endorsed by B. and C., and
the goods in the meantime were forwarded
to his residence. The notes were never
delivered. The goods were afterwards
assigned to B. and C. The court held
that the title never passed to the vendee,
as the condition upon which the sale was
made had not been performed, and that
B. and C. could not hold them against
the vendor. In Haggerty v. Palmer, 6
Johns. Ch. 437, goods were sold at auction in the city of New York, to be paid
for in approved endorsednotes at four and
six months. The g6ods were delivered
to the vendee, and he afterwards assigned
them to a third party. The court held
that the delivery of the goods was conditional, and the vendee was a trustee

for them until the notes were delivered,
and that the assignment was fraudulent.
In Crawfordv. Smith, 7 Dana (Ky.)
59, plaintiff made an agreement to sell
goods then in his store to defendants.
The next day, the parties commenced
invoicing the goods to ascertain the
amount to be paid by the defendant for
them. During the night, after a considerable portion of the goods had been
invoiced, a thief broke into the store and
stole sundry articles of the aggregate
value of $300, some of which, of the
value of $40 had been invoiced. Crawford brought suit against Smith for the
value of the goods. No recovery was
allowed because he had not parted with
the possession of the goods: see also
Ward v. Shaw, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 404.
The vendor may estop himself from
claiming title, in contracts of this nature
as against a bonafide purchaser from the
vendee in possession, as where he gives
vendee evidence of title, or express or
implied authority to sell. This principle
appears quite well settled, but in. its
application the cases are at variance : I
Benj. on Sales (4th Am. ed.) j 448,
et seg.
In dealing with contracts of this nature
to avoid confusion an important distinction is to be noted between an option to
purchase if the vendee should like the
article, and an option to return it, if he
should not like it. In the first, the title
will :not pass until the option is determined; in the second, the title passes at
once. One is an agreement to sell, and
the other is an absolute sale. Hunt v.
Wyman, 100 Mass. 198, clearly illustrates this distinction.
In the transfer of title to personal
property upon a cash' sale, only two
things are essential, namely, payment by
the vendee, and. actual or constructive
delivery by the vendor. The first may
be waived, and is waived by.vendor by
delivery, for confidence is reposed, credit
is given and property passes: Chapman
v. Lathrop, 6 Cowen 110 ; Harris v.
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Smith, 3 S. & R. 20, 24; 2 Kent's
Com.391.
It is also a familiar principle that
where personal property passes out of
the hands of the vendor, he thereby loses
all right of lien. The only exception is
in eases of stoppage in transtu, and that
can be exercised, only when the vendee
is insolvent, and before the goods get into
his possession: Benj. on Sales,
828,
and notes.
The proposition is also well settled
that the delivery of an article at a fixed
price, to be paid for on approval, at
the option of the receiver, constitutes a
sale, and is treated in all respects as the
property of the vendee.
We shall cite but a few cases to illustrate this rule. In Crocker v. Gullifer,
44 M .493, the defendant took horses
from the plaintiff, and agreed to pay for
or return the same, but it was specifically
agreed that the title should remain in the
plaintiff (vendor). This was held to be
a bailment, because thq title had never
passed out of the plaintiff. The court
said : "The general proposition that the
delivery of an article at a fixed price, to
be paid for or returned, constitutes a
sale, is not questioned. When the option
is with the party receiving, to pay for or
return the goods received, the uniform
current of authority is, that such alternate agreement is a sale." In Holbrook
v. Armstrong, 1 Fair. (Me.) 31, there
was a parol agreement to pay for the
property in dispute, or return the same
at the end of two years. This was held
to amount to a sale. In Dearborne v.
Turner, 16 Me. 17, it was held that
Mason, who received the property,
" having to return or pay, the property
passed to him, and he was at liberty to
sell." In Baswell v. Bicknall, 17 Me.
344, the party receiving the article in dispute, verbally agreed to pay a certain
price therefor,. or return the same in a
given time. "The property," remarked
WEsTON, C. J., "in the thing delivered
passes, and the remedy of the former
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owner vests in contract. It is the option
conceded to the party receiving, which
produces this effect." In Perkins v.
Douglass, 20 Me. 317, the written promise was to return the chattel or pay
therefor. SEEPLEY, J., said : ' Such a
contract does not reserve to the seller a
right in the property for the security of
the purchase-money." In Southwick v.
Smith, 29 Me. 228, notes were given for
hides, and a further agreement to return
the leather made from the same, if the
notes should not be paid at maturity,
and the proceeds to be applied to their
payment. This was held to be a sale.
The following additional cases also well
illustrate the rule under consideration :
Smith v. O7ark, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 83;
Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 4 Watts (Pa.)
121 ; .PRichett v. Cook, 62 Penn. St. 193;
Walker v. Blake, 37 Me. 373, 375;
Beffum v. Merry, 3 Mason 478 ; Ray v.
Thompson, 12 Cush. 281 ; Hurd v.
West, 7 Cowen 752 ; Moss v. Sweet, 16
Ad. & El. 493 ; Jameson v. Gregory, 4
Mete. (Ky.) 363; Chamberlain v. Smith,
44 'enn. St. 431.
The sale is not
"complete while anything remains to be
done to determine its quantity, if the
price depends on this unless this is to be
done by the buyer alone," per COLE, J.,
in Mc Clung v. Kelley, 21 Iowa 511.
Conditional sales like thatin the principal case, where the title of the property is
to be retained in the vendor until the property is fully paid for, are of frequent
occurrence, and are held binding as
between the parties to the contract, in the
absence of controlling statutory regulations, or where the rights of innocent
third parties intervene ; Fosdick v. Schall,
99 U. S. 235, 250; 1 Benj. on Sales
(4th Am. ed.) 425, et seq., and notes,
where the result of the cases are given.
Many states of the Union have enacted
similar statutes to that passed upon in
the principal case, and they are given
full force by the courts. The avowed
purpose of such restrictive legislation is
to protect the interests of innocent third
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persons, who contract with reference to
such personal property, without notice
of the conditions upon which it is held
by the vendee. These statutes are to the
effect that contracts for conditional sales,
where possession is delivered to the
vendee, and the title is reserved to the
seller to secure the price, shall be void
as to the vendee's creditors and buyers
without notice, unless such contracts are
in writing, and filed or recorded in some
public office specified by the statute. The
Iowa statute provides that "no sale,
contract, or lease, wherein the transfer
or ownership of personal property is made
to depend upon any condition, shall be
valid against any creditor or purchaser
of the vendee, or lessee, in actual possession obtained in pursuance thereof, without notice, unless the same be in writing,
executed by the vendor or lessor, acknowledged and recorded, the same as chattel
mortgages :" McClain's Annotated Statute of Iowa (1880),
1922, p. 542;
Miller's Annotated Statute, 1922.
This section lias been passed upon
several times by the Iowa Supreme Court:
Pash v. Wteston, 52 Iowa 676 ; Warner
v. Jameson, 52 Id. 72 ; Singer Sewing
taclhine Co. v. Hfolcomb, 40 Id. 33
Budlong v. Cottrell, 64 Id. 234.
In Pash v. Weston, supra, in construing the section, the court said: The
meaning of this section doubtless is, that
where a sale, etc., is made of personal
property, and the transfer of title is made
to depend upon any condition, the condition shall not be valid against creditors,
etc., unless the terms of the sale be expressed in writing, etc. In other words
creditors, etc., without actual notice of
the condition, may claim that the title
passed to the vendee, unless the vendor
gives constructive notice of the condition
in the manner provided. The sale, we
think, is to be regarded invalid in no
sense except as a conditional sale, hut it
is to be regarded as such in the absence
of notice, actual or constructive. So far
we presume that there is no question."

. Substantially the same statutes are in
force in Illinois (Van Duzor v. Allen, 90
I1. 499); Maine (Boynton v. Libby, 62
Me. 253) ; Minnesota (McClelland v.
Nichols, 24 Minn. 176); Nebraska,
Texas, Vermont (WAitcomb v. Woodworth, 54 Vt. 544 ; Buybee v. Stevens,
53 Id. 389) ; Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin (Benn v. Valley Lumber
Co., 51 Wis. 376).
For additional
authority, see 1 Benj. on Sales, 461 ;
Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235 ; note
of Lucius S. Landreth, Esq., in 21 Am.
Law. Reg. (N. S. )224, 225 ; also Sumner
v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139; s. c. 42 Am. Rep.
104, with note, p. 105 ; and Fairbanks
v. Eureka Co., 67 Ala. 109, for a very
elaborate discussion of the question under
consideration, in the absence of statutory
regulations. The conclusion arrived at
in these cases, is that a purchaser of personal property from one in possession
under a sale upon an unfulfilled condition
gets only the conditional title of his vendor, although he buys in good faith and
in ignorance of the condition.
Bridget v. Cornish, I Mackey (D. C.)
29, is an interesting case. Here there
was a conditional sale of a buggy and
harness. By the terms of the written
agreement, A. "hired" of B., the property for a term of three months from
date, for the sum of $25 per month,
together with a cash payment of $50,
making in all $125, and A. was given
the privilege of purchasing at the end of
the time, by paying an additional $125.
The court held that the equity of the property passed with the possession to A., and
that a subsequent purchaser bona fide
from A., obtained good title, as no lien
of B.'s had been recorded as required by
the statute. The court said 1 The presumption is, that the possessor of personal property is its owner, and the
world have a right to deal with him as
such. They deal at their peril, it i$ true,
but where the title has been qualifiedly
passed with the possession, and the lien
upon it is not reserved according to the
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conditions of the statute, which requires
a written incumbrance and a record of it,

who sells in a public market to a bona
fide purchaser, the sale carries title with

the vendor of the property parts with the
possession at his peril ; and if an equity in
the property by purchase concurring with
the possessiou, is found with a vendor

it."
B. E. BLACrK.
San Francisco, Cal.

BTpreme Court of Indiana.
HOCKETT v. STATE.
The fact that an article is manufactured under a patent granted by the United
States, does not prevent a state, in the exercise of its police powers, from regulating
its use.
A telephone company is a common carrier, in the same sense as a telegraph company. Its instruments and appliances are devoted to public use, and are subject to
legislative control ; so that the legislature of a state may prescribe the maximum
charges for instruments and service.
Such regulation of property devoted to public use is not the taking of private property for public use, nor is it in any way an interference with the constitutional rights
of a citizen in private property.
The word "telephone,"
as used in the act of April 13th 1885, designates and
refers to an entire system, or apparatus composed of all the usual and necessary
instruments for the trausnission and reception of telephonic messages, and not to a
single instrument.
Where a word has become a "term of art," evidence is admissible to explain its
proper meaning.
Where a legislature has power and authority to enact a law, the courts cannot sit
in judgment on its justice or expediency.

APPEAL from Marion Criminal Court.

.cDonald,

Butler & Mason, Baker, Hord & Hendricks, and

Williams & Thompson, for appellant.

Harris& Calkins, and _Byfield & Howard, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NIBLACK, C. J.-On the thirteenth day of April 1885, the legislature of this state passed an act entitled "An act to regulate the
rental allowed for the use of telephones, and fixing a penalty for its

violation ;" the tenor of which is as follows :
" Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state
of Indiana, that no individual, company, or corporation, now or hereafter owning, controlling or operating any telephone line, in opera-

tion in this state, shall be allowed to charge, collect, or receive as
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rental for the use of such telephone a sum exceeding three -dollars
per month, where one telephone only is rented by one individual,
company, or corporation. Where two or more telephones are rented
by the same individual, company, or corporation, the rental per
month for each telephone so rented shall not exceed two dollars and
fifty cents per month.
" Sect. 2. Where any two cities or villages are connected by wire
operated or owned by any individual, company, or corporation, the
price for the use of any telephone, for the purpose of conversation
between such cities or villages, shall not exceed fifteen cents for
the first five minutes ; and for each additional five minutes no sum
exceeding five cents shall be charged, collected or received.
"Sect. 3. Any owner, operator, agent or other person who shall
charge, collect, or receive for the use of any telephone any sum in
excess of tle rates fixed by this act, shall be deemed guilty of a
public offence, and on conviction shall be fined in any sum not
exceeding twenty-five dollars."
On the twenty-seventh day of July 1885, Theodore P. Haughey
requested the Central Union Telephone Company, a corporation
organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, but owning and
operating a telephone exchange and system of telephone lines at the
city of Indianapolis, in this state, to rent him one telephone, to be
used at his residence upon his farm, four and one-half miles from
the company's telephone exchange, and two miles outside of the corporate limits of the city of Indianapolis, and to connect such telephone
with the exchange by the erection of the necessary poles and wires.
In response to this request, the company offered to rent to Haughey
a hand telephone and magneto-bell, and to connect them with its
exchange, and to furnish exchange service from 7 o'clock A. M.until
6 o'clock P.m. each day, for three dollars per month, the company
to have the right to place other subscribers upon the same line.
But Haughey declined to accept that offer, and instead entered into
a contract with the company for the use of "1one battery transmitter
and one magneto-telephone," and "the necessary appliances for
connecting them with the exchange," upon certain terms and conditions named in the contract, for which he agreed to pay the company
the sum of $83.50 for each quarter, or $11.161 ler month. The
contract says:
"The above total sum is based upon the charges itemized as follows : Rental of one magneto-telephone and one battery transmitter
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(two telephones) at the rate of $20 per annum; labor and service,
charges for switching, construction and maintenance, charges for
lines, batteries, central office apparatus, magneto-bell, and other
appurtenances, at the rate of $114 per annum."
The telephone company built the line, and furnished the equipments for the use of Haughey, called for by its contract with him.
At the expiration of the first three, months after the contract went
into effect, the appellant, John E. Hockett, acting as the district
superintendent and general agent of the company at Indianapolis,
demanded of and received from Haughey the sum of $33.50, claimed
to be due, under the contract, for the latter's use of the line, and
equipments therein provided for during the preceding three months.
An information was thereupon filed against Hockett, charging him
with a violation of the provisions of the act of the legislature hereinbefore set out, and upon proof of the matters above stated, with
others of a formal, incidental, or a merely collateral character, the
court below found him guilty of having charged more for the use
of the telephone than the law permitted him, as well as the company
he represented, to do, and, after overruling a motion for a new trial
adjudged that he pay a fine as a penalty for the commission of a
criminal offence.
It was shown at the trial that the articles furnished to Haughey
as a telephone equipment, as well as all the other mechanical contrivances used by the company in the transmission of words and
sounds over its wires, are patented articles, and that the company
holds the right to use these patented articles by assignment, either
direct or remote, from the patentees. It is first and most earnestly
contended that, as the articles used by the company as above are
under the constitution and laws of the United States, the legislature
of a state has no power to limit the price, use, sale, or rental value
of such articles, and that as a consequence, all acts of a state legislature of the class to which the one before us belongs are inoperative
and ineffectual for any practical purpose.
Conceding the force as well as the plausibility of many of the
arguments and illustrations used by counsel, the ready and indeed
inevitable answer is that the question thus presented ought no longer
be regarded as an open question. There is a reserved and at the
same time well recognised power, affecting their domestic concerns
remaining in all the states, which the government of the United
States cannot and has seldom attempted to invade. This power is
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so varied and comprehensive that an exact definition, as applicable
to all its phases, has so far been found to be impracticable, but the
instance in which the existence of such a power has been judicially
recognised in particular cases are quite numerous, as well as various
in their application to our complex system of government. This
reserved power is usually, though perhaps not always accurately,
denominated the police power of a state, and embraces the entire
system of internal state regulation, having in view, not only the
preservation of public order, and the prevention of offences against
the state, but also the promotion of such intercourse between the
inhabitants of the state as is calculated to prevent a conflict of rights
and to promote the interests of all. Cooley, Const. Lim. § 572. It
is a power inherent in every sovereignty, and is, in its broadest
sense, nothing more than the power of a state to govern men and
things within the limits of its own dominion: License Cases, 5
How. 582. It.extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and convenience, as well as the property, of all persons
within the state. It authorizes the legislature to prescribe the mode
and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure
others, and to do whatever is necessary to promote the public welfare not inconsistent with its' own organic law: Thorp v. Rutland
Bd., 27 Vt. 149.
In 1867, letters patent were issued to one De Witt for a discovery'
in the manufacture of a quality of oil known as "Aurora Oil," and
one Patterson became the assignee of the right conferred upon
De Witt by his letters patent. Under a system of inspection provided by the laws of Kentucky, some casks containing this Aurora
oil were branded, " Unsafe for illuminating purposes," and, notwithstanding a statute of that state making it a penal offence to sell
oil thus branded, Patterson sold the casks of oil in question to one
Davis. Patterson was thereupon indicted, tried and convicted in
one of the Kentucky courts for the alleged unlawful sale of these
condemned casks of oil. This judgment convicting Patterson of a
criminal offence having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
that state, the cause was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
-States to test the validity of the statute under which Patterson was
so convicted, as a restraint upon the sale of a commodity covered by
letters patent from the United States. Upon a review of.all the
questions involved, the validity of the statute was maintained, and
the judgment of the Court of Appeals was in all things affirmed:
'B.
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See Pattersonv. _Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501. The court held in that
case, and as we have no doubt correctly, that all that the letters
patent secured was the exclusive right in the discovery, and that the
right thus secured was an incorporeal right, and hence without
"tangible substance ;" that the right to sell the oil was not derived
from the letters patent, but existed and could have been exercised
before the issuing of such letters, unless prohibited by some local
statute; that because the patentee acquired a monopoly in his dis-.
covery, and was hence secure against interference, it did not follow
that the tangible property, which came into existence by the application of the discovery, was beyond the control of the state legislation; that, on the contrary, the right of property in the physical
substance, which is the fruit of the discovery, is altogether distinct
from the discovery itself, just as the property in the instruments or
plate by which copies of a map are multiplied is distinct from the
copyright itself; that hence the right conferred upon the patentee,
and his assigns, to make, use, and vend the corporeal article or
commodity, brought into existence by the application of the patented
discovery, must be exercised in subordination to the police or local
regulations established by the state. The doctrine of that case was
approved and followed in the more recent case of Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, and has the support, either in direct terms
or in principle, of numerous other carefully considered cases: Patterson v. Com., 11 Bush 311; State v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St.
298; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 586, and note; Jordanv. Dayton, 4 Ohio
295; Try v. State, 63 Ind. 552 ; People v. Russell, 49 Mich. 617 ;
Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. 395; Martinetti v. llfaguire, 1
Deady 216; Vannini v. Paine, 1 Harr. 65 ; License Tax Oases,
b Wall. 462; U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Id. 41; Railroad Co. v. Jfusen,
95 U. S. 465 ; ]Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 Id. 25 ; Brechbill v.
Randall, 102 Ind. 528 ; s. c. 1 N. E. -Rep. 362; Palmer v. State,
39 Ohio St. 236; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 95

Ind. 12.
While, therefore it is true that letters patent confer upon the
patentee a monopoly to the extent of vesting in him, his heirs and
assigns, the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the tangible
property brought into existence by a practical application of the
discovery covered by the letters patent for a limited time, it is not
true that such exclusive right authorizes the making, using or vending such tangible property in a manner which would be unlawful
VOL.

XXIV.-41

HOCKETT v. STATE.

except for such letters patent, and independently of state legislation
and state control.
It is next contended that the Central Union Telephone Company
was organized, and has so far been conducted, as an ordipary business investment, and is in iti methods, as well as in its relations to its
patrons and subscribers, a merely private enterprise, no more subject to legislative control' than any other private business with
which a considerable number of persons have become either directly
or indirectly connected; that consequently the act of the legislature
under which this prosecution was instituted, is inoperative and void
as a restraint upon the company in its charges for the rental and
use of its i nstruments. The telephone .is one of the remarkable
productions of the present century, and although its discovery is of
recent date, it has been in use long enough to have attained welldefined relations to the general public. It has become as much a
matter of public convenience and of public necessity as were the
stage-coach and sailing vessel a hundred years ago, or as the
steamboat, the railroad, and the telegraph have become in later
years. It has already become an important instrument of commerce.
No other known device can supply the extraordinary facilities which
it affords. It may therefore be regarded, when relatively considered, as an indispensable instrument of commerce. The relations
which it has assumed towards the public make it a common carrier
of news-a common carrier in the sense in which the telegraph is a
common carrier-and impose upon it certain well-defined obligations
of a public character. All the instruments and appliances used by
a telephone company in the prosecution of its business are consequently, in legal contemplation, devoted to a public use: tate
v. Nebraska Telep. Co., 17 Neb. 126; 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
262; State of Missouri v. Bell Telep. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 539;
State v. Telep. Co., 36 Ohio St. 296; American R. Tel. Co. v.
Connecticut Telep. Co., 44 Am. Rep. 237, and note.
It is now a well settled legal proposition that property thus devoted
to a public use becomes a legitimate subject of legislative regulation
and control. In recognition of that doctrine the case of Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, has become a leading case. It was in
general terms, held in that case, that when the owner of property
devotes it to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in such use, and must, to the extent
of that interest, submit to be controlled by the public, for the corn-
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mon good, as long as he maintains the use to which lie has so devoted
his property, and that he can only escape such public control by
withdrawing his grant and discontinuing the use. In support of
that conclusion the court said it has been customary in England
from time immemorial, and this country from its first colonization,
to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers,
wharfingers, innkeepers, and the like, and in so doing, to fix a
maximum of charges to be made for services rendered, accommodations extended and articles sold. This case has been the subject of
much unfriendly comment, and has encountered some very sharp
criticism, but its authority as a precedent remains unshaken. This
state regulation and control of property devoted to a public use 'is
not the taking of property for a public purpose, within the meaning
of section 66 of article 1, of the constitution of this state ; nor is
such regulation and control an interference with the guarantied
rights of the citizen in private property. As bearing generally upon
the subjects last above referred to, see also, the cases of Ohicago,
.B. & Q. Rd. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; Chicago, U1. & St. P. Rd.
v. Ackley, Id. 179 ; Winona &. St. P. Rd. v. Blake, Id. 180 ;
Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 Id. 521; Railroad Co. v. Fuller,
17 Wall. 560; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Id. 678; Ruggles v.
Illinois, 108 U. S. 526; SpringValley Waterworks v. Schottler,
110 U. S. 347; Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill. 256; illinois Cent. Rd.
v. People, 108 U. S. 541; Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East 527; Mobile
v. Yuille, 3 Ala. (N. S.) 137 ; .NT. . Nam Co. v. MLerchants' Bank,
6 row. 344; Bolt v. Stennett, 8 Term R. 606; Com. v. Duane,
98 Mass. 1; Com. v. Tewksbury, 11 MIete. 55; Com. v. Alger, 7
Gush. 53; MetropolitanBoara v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Sharpl~ss v. Mayor, 21 Penn. St.
147; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18
Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. .lhfassachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Ogden v.
Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind.
179 ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Id. 12 ; IndianapolisBd.
v. Kercheval, 16 Id. 84; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201;
Brechbill v. Randall, 102 Ind. 528; Try v. State, 63 Ind. 552;
Toledo Agricultural Works v. Work, 70 Id. 253 ; West Virginia
Co. v. Oil Co., 5 W. Va. 882 ; Statev. Perry, 5 Jones 252; Att.Gen. v. Railroad, 85 Wis. 425.
The obvious deduction from what has been said, as well as from
the authorities cited, is that the power of a state legislature to pre-
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scribe the maximum charges which a telephone company may make
for services rendered, facilities afforded, or articles of property
furnished for use in its business, is plenary and complete.
It was made to appear by the evidence that there are several
instruments more or less in use by telephone companies, each known
as a "telephone ;" one as the "Hand Telephone," another as the
"Box Telephone," a third as the "1Switchman's Head Telephone,"
and the fourth as the "Battery Transmitting Telephone ." that the
first, known also as the "Bell Hand or Magneto Telephone," consists of a bar magnet; with a helix of wire at one end, and a diaphragm suitably mounted, in front of the helix, and a hard rubber
case supporting the whole, with combined poles for making connection, with a cord from 24 to 30 inches long, and through it with a
magneto-bell; that this telephone will both transmit and receive
sounds or words carried electrically over a connecting wire; that
this instrument was at first, with the assistance only of the magneto
or call bell used in transmitting, as well as in receiving telephonic
-messages; that some time after this Bell hand telephone bd thus
come into use, the battery transmitting telephone, known as the
"Blake Transmitter," was introduced and generally accepted as a
very decided improvement in the transmission of words and sounds
over wires used by telephone companies, words and sounds being
transmitted through it in a louder tone, and with greater effect than
through the Bell band telephone; that for some time previous to
the thirteenth day of April 1885, this Blake transmitter had come
into general use in the transmission of messages with that class of
patrons and subscribers who desired the best available telephonic
service; that since the Blake transmitter had come into general use
as stated, the Bell hand telephone had been chiefly used as a
receiver of messages-only a comparatively few persons continuing
to use it also for transmitting purposes ; that on the day last named
and for a considerable time previously, a fully equipped organization"
for the convenient and ready transmission and reception of messages
over telephonic wires consisted, as it still consists, of a Bell hand
telephone and cord, a Blake transmitter, a magneto or call bell, a
cell of battery, a back-board, and a battery box ; that the instruments thus constituting a telephonic equipment have been, and still
are, only rented by telephone companies to their patrons and subscribers, the latter not being allowed to either purchase or to ow'p
any of such instruments.
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Upon the facts thus disclosed by the evidence, it is, in the third
place contended that the act of April 18th 1885, under consideration, only limits the price to be charged to three dollars per month,
when one instrument known as a telephone is rented to a patron or
subscriber, and does not apply to a case, like the one before us,
where two instruments, each answering to that name, are, for his
greater convenience, rented to the same person to be used together,
and that consequently the facts of this case do not bring it within
the penal provisions of that act. In a general sense, the name
"telephone " applies to any instrument or apparatus which transmits sound beyond the limits of ordinary audibility. The speaking
tube used in conveying the sound of the voice from one room to
another in large buildings, or a stretched cord or wire attached to

vibrating membranes or disks by which the voice is carried to a distant point, is, strictly speaking, a telephone. But since the recent
discoveries in telephony the name is technically and primarily
restricted to an instrument or device which transmits sound by means
of electricity and wires similar tp telegraphic wires. In a secondary
sense, however; being the sense in which it is most commonly under-.
stood, the word "telephone" constitutes a generic term, having
reference generally to the art of telephony as an institution, but
more particularly to the apparatus, as an entirety, ordinarily used in
the transmission as well as in the reception of telephonic messages.
In this latter sense the Central Union Telephone Company, in
behalf of which the appellant stands as the representative in this
proceeding, has very significantly sanctioned the use of the word
In August, 1885, it published a book for the use of
"telephone."
its patrons and subscribers, entitled "Indianapolis Telephone
Directory," in which those having the use of its telephonic instruments were instructed as follows :
"Call by number. When through talking, ring out. Make all
complaints to the chief operator, call No. 1000.

Help each other

by answering your telephone promptly. Do not allow non-subscribers to use your telephone ; it is unjust to other subscribers,
impedes the service, and is a violation of your contract."
These were a substantial repetition of instructions issued by the
Western Telephone Company, one of the predecessors of the Central Union Telephone Company, in June 1883. In these instructions the "1telephone" is plainly referred to as an organized
apparatus,-an institution,-and not as a single instrument. In
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this use of the word "telephone" the telephone companies in questibn, simply adopted and emplasized what had already been generally accepted as the proper meaning of that word, in the connection
in which it was so used by them.
Before the great discovery of Prof. Morse in telegraphy, the
power of electricity to give a sudden and mysterious impulse to a
suspended wire, was well. understood among those most familiar
with experiments in electrical science. His discovery consisted in
the invention of an instrument or machine which utilized that power
of electricity, and thereby enabled him to send intelligible messages
over suspended wires, to remotely distant places. When that instrument or machine first came into use, the word ".telegraph" was
understood to more particularly refer to it, as the thing best known
by that name; but since that time a much wider and more comprehensive meaning has been attached to that word. The "telegraph"
is now usually accepted, and in common parlance is generally understood, as referring to the entire system of appliances used in the
transmission of telegraphic messages, by electricity, consisting ofFirst, a battery, or other source of electric power; secondly, of a
line, wire, or conductor for conveying the electric current from one
station to another; thirdly, of the apparatus for transmitting, interrupting, and, if necessary, reversing the electric current at pleasure;
and fourthly, of the indicator or signaling instrument. See Imperial Dict., title " Telegraph."
In the respect indicated, the varying meanings of the word "telephone" are analogous to those applied to the word "telegraph ;"
there being very much in common between the two systems of telephony and telegraphy. In reaching a conclusion as to what is generally understood by the use of the word "telephone," we have
been governed partly by the information judicially within our reach,
and in other respects by the evidence. The word having become a
term of art, evidence was admissible to explain its proper meaning ;
Greenl. Ev. sect. 280; Whart. Ev. sects. 961-972. In view of
the condition of things as shown to have existed on the thirteenth
day of April 1885, we feel constrained to hold that the word "telephone," as used in the act of that date, was intended to designate,
and in fact really referred to an apparatus composed of all the usual
and necessary instruments for the convenient and ready transmission and reception of telephonic messages, and not to a single
instrument only.
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There was evidence at the trial tending to prove that the Central
Union Telephone Company cannot supply the facilities to Haughey
provided for in its contract with him, for three dollars per month,
without actual and very serious loss; and, arguing that the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended to inflict injustice upon
any person or corporation, it is insisted we ought to take the company's liability to sustain a great loss, in a certain contingency,
into consideration, in determining the legislative intention in enacting the statute in question in this case. This argument is largely
based upon the assumption that the company was not at liberty to
decline to extend its line to Haughey's farm, upon his request that
such an extension should be made, and that it will be compelled to
maintain such extension so long as Haughey may require it to be
maintained, independently of any contract with him on the subject.
This assumption is, however, not well founded. There is nothing
in the act of the legislature under review, or contained in any other
statutory or common-law regulation applicable to the subject to which
our attention has been called, which requires a telephone company
to construct a new line against its will, or to maintain an old line
longer than it may feel inclined to do so, in the exercise of a legitimate business discreion. Besides, the power of the legislature to
pass the act in question being conceded, this court cannot sit in
judgment upon either the justice or the expediency of the enactment of such a law. If the law shall prove to be either unjust or
inexpedient in its operation, whether upon persons or corporations,
the appeal must be to the legislature, and not to the courts; 20
Cent. L. J. 83.
The judgment is affrmed, with costs.
Telephone cases are not numerous.
The first we shall notice are those touching the companies' right to use the publie highways for the stretching of their
wires. In this respect telephone companies do not differ from telegraph companies, and may be subjected to the
restrictions and rules that the latter are.
It has been held that telegraph poles in
a city should he shapely and not unsightly:
Forsgthe v. B. 6- 0. Telegraph Co., 12
Mo. App. 494. If erected under a
statute, the city, perhaps, cannot thus
regulate them: Gay v. Mutual Union
Telegraph Co., Id. 485. If a wire of a

telegraph company so sway as to interfere with public travel, and one is injured
without fault on his part, he may recover
damages from the owners of the -wire:
Dickey v. Maine Telegraph Co., 46 Ile.
483; see Young v. Yarmouth, 9 Gray
386.
The authority given by legislatures to
telegraph companies to erect poles in public streets is subject to the liability to make
compensation to the adjacent land-owner
for the use: Board of Trade Telegraph
Co. v. Barnett, 107 Il1. 507 ; the company sought to erect poles on the highway running through the plaintiff's land;
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and it was held to be an additional
burden to the easement. Yet in Massa-chusetts exactly the opposite was held:
Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 ; although
,hree out of seven judges dissented, and
lelivered an able opinion in opposition
to the position taken by the majority.
Following the Illinois case are the cases
of Dusenburyv. Mutual TelegraphCo., Ii
Abb. N. C. 440 ; Atlantic 4- PacificTelegraph Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island 4PacficRd. Co., 6 Biss. 158; Southwestern Rd. Co. v. Southern 4- Atlantic Telegraph Co., 46 Geo. 43. Where the fee
in street is in the public : contra, Metropolitan Telegraph Co., 67 How. Pr.
365; People v. Metropolitan Telephone
4- Telegrapk Co., 31 Hun 596.
A case of some interest arose in England. The Court -of Appeals in this
case decided that the municipal corporation (in the particular case a local board
of works), in which was vested the publie street, for the purposes of keeping it
open, improved and repaired as a public
street, did not own the space above the
street usque ad calum. The question was
whether a statute (18 & 19 Viet. ch.
120, sec. 96), gave the hoard of works
or a particular district of the metropolis
a right to an injunction to prevent a telephone company from carrying their wires
diagonally across the street at the level
of the chimneys, the owner of the houses
not objecting, and they not being a nuisance, nor creating appreciable dangers.
The injunction was granted ; but on
appeal, the decision was reversed, because
the board had not such an interest as
entitled them to maintain the action,
unless the act created a nuisance or rendered the street dangerous to the public ;
applying the principle of Coverdale v.
Charlton, 48 L. J. Rep. 128. See Board
of Works v. United Telephone Co., Limited, 51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 148. In
Louisiana it was decided that an adjoining landowner cannot have poles removed on the ground that they are a
nuisance : Irwin v. Great Southern Tel.
Co., 20 Reporter 174.

A case of considerable importance
arose in Nebraska. In that case it was
decided, that a telephone company, undertaking to supply a public demand,
must serve all alike, without discrimination ; that it is a common carrier of
news, and all persons are entitled to
equal facilities in the enjoyment of the
benefits to be derived from its use;
and if no good reason is assigned for a
refusal by a company to furnish a telephone to a person desiring its use or a
subscriber, a writ of mandamus will
issue to compel the company to furnish
such person with the necessary instruments, ofi a tender of a full compliance
with all reasonable rules established for
subscribers: State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126; 24 Am. L.
Beg. 262.
So in Missouri, where a telegraph
company applied to a telephone company for service and was refused, a
writ of mandamus was issued to compel
the granting of service: American Union
Telegraph Co. v. Bell Telephone Co.,
abstracted in 10 Cent. L. J. 438; and
in 11 Cent. L. J. 359; 38 Am. Rep.
587 ; 44 Id. 241.
In Kentucky, the plaintiffs were the
proprietors of public carriages, and the
defendants were a telephone company
that was also the proprietors of public
carriages.
The defendants were restrained by the Louisville Chancery
Court from removing their telephone
from the plaintiffs' office, and from refusing to transact the plaintiffs' telephone
business, pursuant to a contract between
the parties. Louisville Transfer Co. v.
Amer. Dist. Tdephone Co., 24 Alb. L.
J. 283 ; abstracted in 38 Am. Rep.
588 ; 44 Id. 242.
In the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri arose the case of
The State of Missouri ex rel. Baltimore 4- Ohio Telegraph Co.. v. Bell
Tephone, 24 Am. L. Reg. 573. The
point decided was this: A., a Massachusetts corporation, and the owner of a
patent on a telephone, licensed B., a
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Missouri corporation, to do the telephone business of St. Louis, upon condition that B. should not establish telephonic connection with any telegraph
company unless speeially authorized by
A. A. permitted B. to establish telephonic connection with the Western
Union Telegraph Co. Afterwards, the
Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Co. applied for a mandamus to compel B. to
perform telephonic communication between it and the petitioners. A. was
not made a party. It was held that A.
was not a necessary party; that all
other telegraph companies were entitled
to the same privilege granted to the
Western Union Telegraph Co., upon
paying the same price; and that the
petitioner was entitled to the relief
asked. The chief point made was that
it could not discriminate between patrons.
In Ohio a statute provided that telegraph companies should receive dispatches
from and for other telegraph lines, and
from and for individuals, and transmit
them with impartiality and good faith.
A contract between a telephone company and the owner of a telephone
instrument, providing that the company
in the use of the instruments should
discriminate as between telegraph companies, was held void as against publie policy. It was further held that,
although the telephone was a patented
article, it was devoted to public use, and
was subject to control by state legislation where the public welfare demanded
it: State v. Telephone Company, 36 Ohio

296; see Public Grain 4-Stock Exchange
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 16 Fed.
Rep. 289-a telegraph case.
A case somewhat similar was before
the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The
defendant was a Connecticut telephone
company, and had purchased from a
-Massachusetts telephone company owning the patent, the right to use its magnetic telephone system, for a certain
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period, on the condition that it should
not permit telegraph companies to use
the system, unless they had purchased
the right from the Massachusetts company. A statute of Connecticut provided that every telephone company
should impartially permit persons and
corporations to transmit speech through
its wires by its instruments. The plaintiffs, a telegraph company in Connecticut,
not having purchased the right, sued to
compel the defendants to permit it to use
the system. The action was held not
maintainable: American Rapid Telegraph
Co. v. Connecticut Telephone Co., 49
Conn. 352.
For a case involving the rights of the
Bell patent and the Drawbaugh patent,
see 25 Fed. Rep. 725.
A second case came before the Supreme
Court of Indiana, and was decided the
same as the principal one: Hackett v.
State, 5 N. E. Rep. 202.
On March 23d 1886, the same court
decided that the telephone company
could be compelled to furnish service to
subscribers, by use of the writ of inandatus : Telephone Company v. State, 5 N.
E. Rep. 721.
The subtile distinction sought to be
drawn in this case is certainly unwarranted ; and has been fairly met by the
court. By the use ofsuch distinctions, any
telegraph company, or any railroad company could escape the regulations sought
to be placed upon it. To allow them
would not only have defeated the object
of the legislature in passing the act
drawn in question, but have rendered it
practically, if not wholly impossible to
pass an act which would cover every
phase of the evil sought to be corrected
by its passage. So long as it had decided to give expression to the legislative
will, the court could not have decided, in
this respect, any other way.
W. W. TitoxlToN.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
PJI(ENIX INSURANCE COMPANY v. ERIE AND WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.
A stipulation in a bill of lading that the carrier shall have the benefit of any insurance on the goods is a valid one, and in such case, even though the loss be occasioned by the negligence of the carrier, the insurance company cannot be subrogated to the rights of the shipper to recover damages for such negligence.
If, as is well settled, a carrier may insure against loss, though occasioned by the
negligence of his own employees, he may also lawfully stipulate with the owner of
goods to be allowed the benefit of insurance voluntarily obtained by the latter.
Where goods were shipped under an oral agreement, with the understanding that
bills of lading would be subsequently issued, and afterwards and after the effecting
of insurance by the shipper; bills of lading were issued containing a provision giving
to the carrier the benefit of any insurance on the goods, which bills were not objected
to by the shipper, and were similar to bills previously issued to him on other shipmen~s, the contract of carriage is to be treated as if made on the day of the oral
agreement and the insurance company claiming to be subrogated to the rights of the
shipper is bound by the conditions of the bill of lading.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
This was a libel in admiralty against a common carrier by an
insurance company, which had insured the owners upon the goods
carried, and had paid them the amount of the insurance and claimed
to be subrogated to their rights against the carrier. The defence
relied on was that by a provision of the contract of carriage, the
carrier was to have the benefit of any insurance upon the goods.
The district court held that this provision was valid, and therefore
no right of subrogation accrued to the libellant, and entered a decree
accordingly. The libellant appealed to the Circuit Court, which
found the following facts: The respondent was a Pennsylvania corporation, authorized to carry on the business of lake transportation,
and engaged in business as a common carrier, and owned a line of
propellers running between Erie and other ports on the lakes, called
the "Anchor Line," one of which propellers was the "Merchant."
On July 24th 1874, the firms of A. M. Wright & Co., owners of
16,325.34 bushels of corn, worth $8000; Elmendorf &. Co., owners
of 800 bushels of corn, worth $600, and Gilbert Wolcott & Co.,
owners of 870 bushels of corn, and 689 bushels. of oats, together,
worth $800, caused to be shipped on board the propeller Merchant,
then lying at Chicago, and bound for Erie, the grain aforesaid, consigned to themselves at other places beyond; and severally made
oral agreements with the respondent, by which, in consideration of
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certain stipulated freight, the respondent agreed to transport the
several parcels of grain from Chicago, by way of the lakes, to Erie,
and thence forward them to their ultimate destinations ; and it was
tacitly understood that bills of lading for the shipments would be
subsequently issued to the shippers, but nothing whatever was said
respecting the terms and conditions thereof. After the goods had
been received on board, and the propeller had departed, on her voyage, the respondent delivered to the shippers, respectively, bills of
lading, each of which described the goods as shipped on the propeller Merchant, and addressed to the owners by name at their
ultimate destination, fixed the rate of freight from Chicago to that
destination, and contained an agreement that the goods should be
"transported by the Anchor line, and the steamboats, railroad companies, and forwarding lines with which it connects, until the said
goods shall have reached the point named in the bill of lading, on
the following terms and conditions," among which were these:
"The said Anchor line, and the steamboats, railroad companies,
and forwarding lines with which it connects, and which receive said
property, shall not be liable" "for loss or damage by fire, collision,
or the dangers of navigation while on seas, bays, harbors, rivers,
lakes, or canals; and where grain is shipped in bulk, the said
Anchor line is hereby authorized to deliver the same to the Elevator
Company at Erie, as the agent of the owner and consignee, for
transhipment (but without further charge to such owner and consignee) into the cars of the connecting railroad companies or forwarding lines; and when so transhipped in bulk, the said Anchor
Line and the said connecting railroad company or carrier shall be
and is, in consideration of so receiving the same for carriage, hereby
exempted and released from all liability for loss, either in quantity
or weight, and shall be entitled to all other exemptions and conditions herein contained.
"It is further agreed that the Anchor line, and the steamboats,
railroads and forwarding lines with which it connects, shall not be
held accountable for any damage or deficiency in packages, after the
same shall have been receipted for in good order by consignees or
their agents, at or by the next carrier beyond the point to which
this bill of lading contracts.
"It is further stipulafed and agreed that in case of any loss,
detriment or damage done to or sustained by any of the property
herein receipted for, during such transportation, whereby any legal
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liability or responsibility shall or may be incurred, that company
alone shall be held answerable therefor in whose actual custody the
same may be at the time of the happening of such loss, detriment,
or damage ; and the carrier so liable shall have the full benefit of
any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account of
said goods.
"And it is further agreed that the amount of the loss or damage
so accruing, so far as it shall fall upon the carriers above described,
shall be computed at the value or cost of said goods or property at
the place and time of shipment under this bill of lading."
These bills of lading were received by the shippers, without protest
or objection, and were signed by Elmendorf & Co., and by Wolcott &
Co., but not by A. M. Wright & Co. Thebills of lading were received
by the shippers without specially reading the terms and conditions,
their attention was not directed to them, nor was anything said
respecting them; -and no reduction of freight from the rates stipulated in the oral agreement was made in consequence of those terms
and conditions, or other consideration paid therefor; but the shippers had often before shipped goods by this line under similar contracts, and thereby knew, or had every opportunity of knowing, the
contents of these bills of lading. The propeller completed the
lading of the goods during the evening of July 24th 1874, and about
midnight departed on her voyage. About 10 o'clock the next
morning, in a dense fog, she was stranded on the western shore of
Lake Michigan, about 10 miles south of Milwaukee, through the
negligence of those managing her, and immediately filled with
water, and all the grain became wet and damaged. One thousand
two hundred bushels of it were thrown overboard to get off the
vessel, and 5188 bushels were brought into Milwaukee in a perishable condition, and were there sold for the sum of $1037.60, which
was retained by the respondent. On said twenty-fourth of July,
the libellant, a New York corporation, authorized to transact a
general lake and insurance business, iisured the shippers, at their
request and expense, against loss or damage to these shipments from
perils of the seas and other perils; and issued to them certificates
of insurance, for $8000, $520, and $700, respectively, in this form:
"No. 627. TiE PH(ENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, NEW YORK. $8000.
"Chicago, July 24th 1874.
"This certifies that A. M. Wright & Co. [are] insured, under
and subject to the conditions of open policy No. 2263 of the Phoenix
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Insurance Company, in the sum of eight thousand dollars, on corn
on board the propeller Merchant, at and from Chicago to Erie.
Loss payable to assured, order hereon, and return of this certificate.
CHAS. E. CHASE, Agent."
The policy of insurance referred to in these certificates issued
"Charles E. Chase, on account of whom it may concern," "lost or
not lost, at and from ports and places to ports and places, on cargo,
premiums to be settled monthly, upon all kinds of lawful goods and
merchandise laden or to be laden on board" any vessel or vessels ;
and was otherwise in the usual form of an open policy of insurance
for $1,000,000 against marine risks, including perils of the seas,
"1barratry of the master and mariners, and all other perils, losses,
and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or
damage of the said goods and merchandises, or any part thereof;"
and contained these provisions : "The company are to be entitled
to premium at their usual rates on all shipments, reported or not.
It is warranted by the assured to report every shipment on the day
of receiving advices thereof, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, when the rate of premium shall be fixed by the president or
the vice-president of 'the company." "No shipment to be considered
as insured until approved and endorsed on this policy, by C. E.
Chase, agent." The shipments were duly approved and endorsed
on this policy. On August 19th 1874, the shippers abandoned the
goods to the libellant as a total loss, by written instruments, substantially alike, the material part of the one executed by A. M.
Wright & Co., being as follows:
"Chicago, August 19th 1874.
"For and in consideration of the sum of eight thousand dollars,
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we do by these presents
assign, transfer, cede, and abandon to the Phoenix Insurance Company all our right, title, and interest in and to the property hereinafter specified, and to all that can or may in any way be made,
saved or realized from the damage or loss reported to have occurred
by reason of which a claim of payment has been made by us, with
full power to take and use all lawful ways and means (at the risk
and expense of the Phoenix Insurance Company) to make, save, and
realize the said property tb wit, 16,325.34 bushels of corn, as per
bill of lading and invoice, shipped on board the propeller Merchant,
bound from Chicago for Erie, and covered by insurance 'ith the
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Phoenix Insurance Company by. open policy No. 2263, certificate
No. 627, under date of July 24th 1874."
In consequence thereof the "libellant paid to the shippers the
amount of the insurance as and for a constructive total loss. A
general average adjustment was made on September 2d 1874, and
readjusted on February 1st 1875, awarding to the libellant the sum
of $2466.12 on account of these shipment6.
The Circuit Court made and stated the following conclusions of
law: (1) That the bills of lading were the contract by which the
rights of the parties were to be governed; (2) that under them the
respondent became liable to the shippers for the value of the shipments, by reason of the negligent loss of the same, and that the
shippers had rights of action therefoi ; (3) that by the abandonments
the libellant did not succeed to those rights of action of the shippers
by reason of the stipulation contained, in the bills of lading that
"the carrier so liable shall have the full benefit of any insurance
that may have been effected upon or on account of said goods ;"
(4) that the libellant was entitled to recover the sum of $2466,12,
awarded to it in the general average adjustment, readjusted as aforesaid, with interest thereon.
The Circuit Court entered a decree for the libellant for this sum
only, and the libellant appealed to this court.
.eo.

A. Black and Geo. 1.

Van .Dyke, for appellant.

aeo. B. Hfibbard, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, J.-It being found as matter of fact that the lading of
the goods on board the propeller was not completed until the evening of the twenty-fourth of July, that she departed on her voyage
about midnight, and that the bills of lading were not delivered by.
the carrier to the shippers until after her departure, it is clear that
the bills of lading were not actually delivered until the 25th. But
it being also found that oral agreements for the carriage were made
on the 24th, with the understanding that bills of lading would be
subsequently issued, and that the shippers having often before
shipped goods by this line under similar bills of lading, knew or had
every opportunity of knowing their terms and conditions, it is also
clear that the bills of lading were but a putting in form of the oral
agreements made on the 24th, and took effect as if they had been
delivered and accepted on that day. The certificates of the agent
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of the insurance company, without which the policy of insurance
did not attach to these goods, were also made on that day, and
described the goods as on board the propeller. The contract of
carriage and the contract of insurance must therefore be treated as
substantially contemporaneous, and both made before the loss of
the goods. There is nothing to show any misrepresentation or
intentional concealment by the assured in obtaining the insurance,
or that the insurer had or had not knowledge or notice of the usual
form of the bill of lading. The policy of insurance contains no
express stipulation for the assignment to the insurer of the assured's
right of action against third persons. In the bills of lading, it is
expressly stipulated that the carriers whose railroad or vessels form
part of the line of transportation shall not be liable for loss or
damage by fire, collision, or dangers by navigation ; and that each
carrier shall be liable only for a loss of the goods while in its custody,
"and the carrier so liable shall have the full benefit of any insurance
that may have been effected upon or on account of said goods."
The question is whether, under the circumstances the insurer,
upon payment of a loss, became subrogated to the right to recover
damages from the carrier.
When goods insured are totally lost, actually or constructively,
by perils insured against, the insurer, upon payment of the loss,
doubtless becomes subrogated to all the assured's rights of action
against third persons who have caused or are responsible for the loss.
No express stipulation in the policy of insurance, or abandonment
by the assured, is necessary to perfect the title of the insurer.
From the very nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of
indemnity, the insurer, when he has paid to the assured the amount
of the indemnity agreed on between them, is entitled, by way of
salvage, to the benefit of anything that may be received, either from
the remnants of the goods, or from damages paid by third persons
for the same loss. But the insurer stands in no relation of contract
or of privity with such persons. His title arises out of the contract
of insurance and is derived from the assured alone, and can only
be enforced in the right of the latter. In a court of common law it
can only be asserted in his name, and, even in a court of equity or
of admiralty, it can only be asserted in his right. In any form of
remedy, the insurer can take nothing by subrogation but the rights
of the assured: Comegys v. Yasse, 1 Pet. 193, 214; PFretz v. Bull,
12 How. 466, 468; The Monticello, 17 Id. 152, 155; Garrison
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v. Memphis Ins. Co., 19 Id. 312, .317; Hall v. Railroad Co., 13
367, 370, 371; The Potomac, 105 U. S. 630, 634, 635 ; Mobile
4" H. By. v. Turey, 111 Id. 584; 594; Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass.
219; Simpson v. Thompson, 3 App. Cas. 279, 286, 292i 293.
That the right of the assured to recover damages against a third
person is not incident to the property in the thing insured, but only
a personal right of the assured, is clearly shown by the fact that
the insurer acquires a beneficial interest in that right of action, in
proportion to the sum paid by him; not only in the case of a total
loss, but likewise in the case of a partial loss, and when no interest
in the property is abandoned or accrues to him: Hall v. Railroad
Cos., The Potomac, and Simpson v. Thompson, above cited.
The right of action against another person, the equitable interest
in which passes to the insurer, being only that which the assured
has, it follows that if the assured has no such right of action none
passes to the insurer, and that if the assured's right of action is
limited or restricted by lawful contract between him and the person
sought to be made responsible for the loss, a suit by the insurer, in
the right of the assured, is subject to like limitations or restrictions.
For instance, if two ships owned by the same person, come into
collision by the fault of the master and crew of the one ship, and to
the injury of the other, an underwriter who has insured the injured
ship, and received an abandonment from the owner, and paid him
the amount of the insurance as and for a total loss, acquires thereby
no right to recover against the other ship because the assured, the
owner of both ships could not sue himself: Simpson v. Thompson,
above cited; Globe ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 50, 68.
Upon the same principle, any lawful stipulation between the
owner and the carrier of goods, limiting the risks for which the carriei shall be answerable, or the time of making the claim, or the
value to be recovered, applies to any suit brought in the right of the
owner, for the benefit of his insurer, against the carrier, as, for
instance, if the contract of carriage expressly exempts the carrier
from liability for losses by fire (York Co. v. Central Bd., 3 Wall.
107), or requires claims against the carrier to be made 'vithin three
months (Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Id. 264), or fixes the value for
which the carrier shall be responsible (Hartv. Pennsylvania Rd.
Co., 112 U. S. 831). So the stipulation, not now in controversy,
in the bills of lading in the present case, making the value of the
goods at the place and time of shipment, the measure of the carrier's
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liability, would control, although in the absence of such a stipulation
the carrier would be liable for the value at the place of destination,
. By. v. Jurey, Ill U. S. 584.
as held in Mobile
The stipt.::,tion in these bills of lading that carriers "shall not be
liable for lo.-s or damage by fire, collision or the dangers of navigation," clearly does hot protect them from liability for any loss occasioned by their own negligence. By the settled doctrine of this
court, even an express stipulation in the contract of carriage that a
common carrier shall be exempt from liability for losses caused by
the negligence of himself and his servants, is unreasonable and contrary to public policy, and therefore void: Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Railroad Co. v. Pratt,22 Id. 123; Bank of
Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; Railway Co. v.
Stevens, 95 Id. 655. And it may be that, as held by Judge WA.
LACE in a case in the Circuit Court, a stipulation that " no damage
that can be insured against will be paid for," would not protect the
carrier from liability for his own negligence, because that would be
to compel the owners of the goods to insure against the negligence
of the carrier: The Ifadji, 22 Blatchf. 235. But the stipulation
upon the subject of insurance, in the bills of lading before us is
governed by other cbnsiderations. It does not compel the owner
of the goods to stand his own insurer, or to obtain insurance on the
goods; nor does it exempt the carrier in case of loss by negligence
of himself or his servants, from liability to the owner, to the same
extent as if the goods were uninsured. It simply provides that the
carrier, when liable for the loss, shall have the benefit of any insurance effected upon the goods.
It is conclusively settled, in this country and in England, that a
policy of insurance, taken out by the owner of a ship or goods,
covers a loss by perils of the sea or other perils insured against,
although occasioned by the negligence of the master or crew or other
persons employed by himself: Waters v. J1fereh. Louisville Ins. Co.,
11 Pet. 213; Copeland v. -ew England Ins. Co., 2 Met. 432;
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351, 366 ; Davidson v. Burnand, L. R., 4 0. P. 117, 121. Any one who has made himself
responsible for the safety of goods has a sufficient interest in them
to enable him to insure them. Contracts of reinsurance, by which
one insurer causes the sum'which he has insured to be reassured to
him by a distinct contract with another insurer, with the object of
indemnifying himself against his own responsibility (though proVOL. XXXI V.-43
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hibited for a time in England by statute), are valid by the common
law, and have always been lawful in this country ; and in a suit upon
such a contract the subject at risk, and the loss thereof, must be
proved in the same manner as if the original assured were the plaintiff: 3 Kent Com. 278, 289 ; Sun Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. (lo., 107
U. S. 485; Mackenzie v. Whitworth, L. R., 10 Exch. 142, and 1
Exch. Div. 36. So a common carrier, a warehouseman, or a
wharfinger, whether liable by law or custom to the same extent as
an insurer, or only for his own negligence, may, in order to protect
himself against his own responsibility, as well as to secure his lien,
cause the goods in his custody to be insured to their full value, and
the policy need not specify the nature of his interest: Crowley v.
Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478 ; .De Forrestv. .Fulton Ins. Co., 1 Hall 94,
110 ; Waters v. Monarch Ass. Co., 5 E. & B. 870; London &N.
W. By. v. Glyn, 1 Id. 652; Savage v. Corn -Exch. Ins. Co., 36
N. Y. 555; Joyce v. Kennard, L. R., 7 Q. B. 78; Cor. v. Shoe
& Leather Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 131; Rome Ins. Co. v. Baltimore
Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527; N. B. Ins. Co. v. London L. & G.
Ins. Co., 5 Ch. Div. 569.
No rule of law or of public policy is violated by allowing a common carrier, like any other person having either the general property or a peculiar interest in goods, to have them insured against
the usual perils, and to recover for any loss from such perils, though
occasioned by the negligence of his own servants. By obtaining
insurance, he does not diminish his own responsibility to the owners
of the g6ods, but rather increases his means of meeting that responsibility. If it were true that a ship-owner, obtaining insurance by
a general description upon his ship and the goods carried by her,
could, in case of the loss of both ship and goods, by perils insured
against, and through the negligence of the master and crew, recover
of the insurers for the loss of the ship only, and not for the loss of
the goods, some trace of the distinction would be found in the books.
But the learning and research of counsel have failed to furnish any
such precedent. On the contrary, in one of the earliest cases in
which the rule that a policy of insurance covers losses by perils
'insured against, though occasioned by the negligence of the servants of the assured, was judicially affirmed, the assured, being the
owner of a ship, had chartered her for a West India voyage, and
by the usages of trade bore the risk of bringing the cargo from the
shore to the ship. The policy was upon the boats of the ship, and
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upon goods in them; and the amount recovered of the insurer was
for goods being carried from the shore to the ship in her boats, and
lost by the wrecking of the boats in consequence of the misconduct
and neglig, ice of some of the ship's crew. Such was the state of
facts to which Lord Chief Justice ABBOTT applied the language,
cited and approved by Mr. Justice STORY in Waters v. Merch.
Louisville Ins. Co., 11 Pet. 222, and by Chief Justice S-IAw in
Copeland v. N. E. Ins. Co., 2 Mete. 442: "In this case the immediate cause of the loss was the violence of the winds and waves.
No decision can be cited where, in such a case, the underwriters
have been held to be excused in consequence of the loss having been
remotely occasioned by the negligence of the crew. I am afraid of
laying down any such rule; it will introduce an infinite number
of questions as to the quantum of care which, if used, might have
prevented the loss. Suppose, for instance, the master were to send
a man to the mast-head to look out, and he falls asleep, in consequence of which the vessel runs upon a rock, or is taken by the
enemy, in that case it might be argued, as here, that the loss was
imputable to the negligence of one of the crew, and that the underwriters were not liable. These and a variety of other such questions would be introduced, in case our opinion were in favor of the
underwriters :" Walker v. Maitland, 5 B. & Ald. 171, 174, 175.
So, in the recent case of N. B. Ins. Co. v. London, L. 4&a. Ins.
Co., it was assumed as unquestionable that insurance obtained by a
wharfinger would cover a loss by his own negligence: 5 Ch. Div.
584.
As the carrier might lawfully himself obtain insurance against
the loss of the goods by the usual perils, though occasioned by his
own negligence, he may lawfully stipulate with the owner to be
allowed the benefit of insurance voluntarily obtained by the latter.
This stipulation does not, in terms or in effect, prevent the owner
from being reimbursed the full value of the goods; but, being valid
as between the owner and the carrier, it does prevent either the
owner himself, or the insurer, who can only sue in his right, from
maintaining an action against the carrier upon any terms inconsistent with this stipulation.
Nor does this conclusion impair any lawful rights of the insurer.
His right of subrogation, arising out of the contract of insurance
and payment of the loss, is only to such rights as the assured has,
by law or contract, against third persons. The policy containing
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no express stipulation upon the subject, and there being no evidence
of any fraudulent concealment, or misrepresentation by the owner
in obtaining the insurance, the existence of the stipulation between
the owner and the carrier would have afforded no defence to an action
on the policy, according to two careful judgments rendered in June
last, and independently of each other, the one by the English Court
of Appeal, and the other by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: Tate v. Hyslop, 15 Q. B. Div. 868; Jackson Co. v.
Boylston Ilns. Co., 139 Mass. 508.
In Tate v. Hyslop, owners of goods, insured against risks in
crafts or lighters, had previously agreed with a lighterman that he
should not be liable for any loss in crafts except loss caused by his
own negligence, and did not disclose this agreement to the underwriters at the time of procuring the insurance. The sole ground
on which it wap held that the owners could not recover on the
policy was that this agreement was material to the risk, because the
underwriters, as the assured knew, had previously established two
rates of premium, depending on the question whether they would
have recourse over against the lighterman. Lord Justice BRETT
observed that, but for the two rates of premium established by the
underwriters and known to the assured, the omission of the assured
to disclose their agreement with the lighterman could only have
effected the amount of salvage which the udnderwriters might have,
and would have been immaterial to the risk, and consequently to
the insurance: 15 Q. B. Div. 875, 876.
In Jackson Co. v. Boylston 1ns. Co. it was adjudged that, in the
absence of any fraud or intentional concealment, the undisclosed
existence of a stipulation between the assured and the carrier, like
that now before us, afforded no defence to an action on the policy.
It may be added that our conclusion accords with the decision of
Judge SHIPMAN in Rintoul v. Y. . Cent. Bd., 21 Blatchf. 439;
(s. c. 28 Am. Law Reg. N. S.294, and note), as well as with those
of Judge DYER in the District Court, and Judge DRUMMOND in the
Circuit Court, in the present case. 10 Biss. 18, 88. See, also,
Carstairs v. Mech. & Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 478; The
Sidney, 28 Fed. Rep. 88 ; Mtercantile Ins. Co. v. Calebs, 20 N.Y.
173.
Decree affirmed.
BRADLEY,:J., dissented.

